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We propose a simple investment model which shows that, in the presence of ﬂuc-
tuations in and uncertainty about the opportunity cost of time, marginal individuals
may choose to delay their education if the opportunity cost of time is temporarily
high. Importantly, it is when the completion of the degree is uncertain, but likely
enough that individuals will consider delaying their education. As a result, when
returns to education are relatively low, education and timing of education will be
sensitive to ﬂuctuations in the opportunity cost of time. If return is high, delay
is never optimal. These ﬁndings are supported by Swedish university enrolment
patterns, and cross-country evidence on age of university freshmen.
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1 Introduction
University students are older now than before. There is substantial cross-country variation
in age of university freshmen. The age of university freshmen appears to depend on family
background. These statements, for which we will provide some empirical support, provide
the basic motivation for studying the determinants of delayed educational investments.
The Ben-Porath (1967,1970) model of human capital investments over the life cycle
predicts that the bulk of full time education should take place early in life, when it has
the longest possible pay-back time, and the lowest opportunity cost.1 The force of this
argument, further strengthened by the work of Becker (1975) and Mincer(1974) and the
fact that students historically went straight from high school to university may explain
why the huge literature estimating the return to education has largely ignored the timing
∗We have beneﬁtted from colleagues at the IUI and seminar participants at the University of Bergen.
Financial support from the Swedish Research Council is gratefully acknowledged.
1Mincer (1997) summarizes Ben-Porath’s contribution.
1issue: It has simply been regarded as a non-issue. Since the median university freshman
in a number of OECD countries, according to OECD (2001), is now far from fresh out of
high school, it is clear that some factors inﬂuencing educational timing are not captured
in the standard life-cycle model.
Although levels vary across countries, an increase in the age of students appears to
be a general phenomenon. Figures 1 and 2, show that in 1970, some three quarters of
US full-time students were 21 or younger. In 1980, the ﬁgure had declined to 70 per
c e n t . A f t e raf u r t h e rd e c l i n et h eﬁgure appears to have stabilized around some 60 per
cent in the late 1990’s. Swedish data, for the 1990’s presented in Figures 3 and 4, reveal
that Swedish students are older than their US fellows. In 1993/94, only a quarter of all
students were 21 or younger. Swedish students became more numerous and continued to
grow older also during the 1990’s. In 2001/2002, less than 20 per cent were below 22.
The Swedish university expansion during the 1990’s was the result of an interplay
between increased demand and political decisions to expand the universities in order to
combat rising youth unemployment. Also the age distribution, is likely to have been
aﬀected by the rapid expansion and by other political measures encouraging already un-
employed young adults to go to university.
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However, a striking feature of the age distribution of university freshmen is that parental
education seems to inﬂuence the age at which individuals go to university. Average ﬁgures
for the 1990’s, in Figure 5, show that of all the freshmen with the least educated parents
(less than high school) only 10 per cent were 21 or younger. The corresponding ﬁgure for
the freshmen with highly educated parents was 35 per cent.
 Distribution of university freshmen by parental education and age group
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Figure 5
This paper presents a simple model of educational investments decisions which sug-
gests that return to education should play a role in explaining cross country variation in
freshman age and why Swedish students are older than their US fellows. A similar ex-
planation is proposed for why parental education matters for freshman age distributions:
4individuals with a low perceived return to education are more likely to delay. The pro-
posed mechanism also suggests that university enrollment of student with low perceived
return should be sensitive to the business cycle. A ﬁr s tg l a n c ea td a t ad o e si n d e e db e a r
this prediction out.
Not all previous studies have ignored timing. Griliches (1980), Light (1995) and Monk
(1997 study the eﬀects of interrupted schooling and delayed college attendance on US-data
a n dc o n c l u d et h a tl a t eh u m a nc a p i t a li n v e s t m e n t sg i v es i g n i ﬁcantly smaller additions to
earnings than early investments. Hence, these studies suggest that there is a link from
late enrollment to low return while this paper provides a link going in the other direction.
Although there are few, if any models, explicitly dealing with the problem of delayed
university enrollment, the framework developed by Ben-Porath and Becker is suggestive
for ﬁnding possible explanations. Rapidly rising university premia is one, which would
cause individuals to re-optimize and hence enroll late. Institutional factors, length of
compulsory schooling and high school programs, availability of loans and admission rules
(and changes in these) may also give rise to late enrollment. For instance, students who
need to self-ﬁnance their education may be forced to delay or interrupt, while students who
do not meet the entry requirements may need to improve their high school grades before
being admitted. Ability uncertainty (and hence uncertainty about the expected marginal
beneﬁts of education) studied in Sjögren and Sällström (2002), is another reason for delay
since it gives rise to a time consuming need to ﬁnd out about ability before enrolling.
This paper proposes a simple educational investment model in which educational in-
vestments are made in the presence of ﬂuctuations in, and uncertainty about the op-
portunity cost of time. It is shown that if times are good, and hence the individual’s
opportunity cost of time is high, marginal individuals, i.e. those who are almost indiﬀer-
ent to getting an education or not, may choose to delay their education. Importantly, it
is when the beneﬁts associated with completing a university degree are low and the event
of completing the degree uncertain, but not too unlikely, that individuals will consider
delaying their education. It is for this group of students, we will expect enrolment and
educational timing to be sensitive to ﬂuctuations in the opportunity cost of time. If the
individual is sure (or almost) not to complete unless he studies early, education invest-
ments will be sensitive to ﬂuctuations in the opportunity cost of time, but timing will not
be an issue.
Although highly stylized, the model generates some testable predictions for university
enrollment patterns. For instance, we should expect to ﬁnd a negative correlation between
return to university education and enrollment age not only because late enrollment gives
lower return, but because low return gives delayed enrollment. A plot of estimates of
returns to education for the 1985-1995 period against the median age of university fresh-
men in 1999 for fourteen countries, presented in Figure 10, shows an expected negative
relation.
At the individual level, our model gives at hand that it is the group of individuals
with mediocre or low returns that will be more prone to delay or not opting for education
at all when facing ﬂuctuating opportunity costs. We would therefore expect this group’s
5university enrollment rates to ﬂuctuate with e.g. the business cycle. Also this prediction
is supported by evidence suggesting that while university enrollment behavior during the
1990’s of Swedish students whose parents had more than the compulsory level of education
showed little or no sensitivity to the business cycle, the enrollment pattern of students
with weak educational background is very similar to the pattern of youth unemployment.
The paper proceeds as follows. Next, we develop a stylized model of the timing of
education when the individual experiences ﬂuctuating opportunity costs of time. Section
3 present some empirical evidence which can be interpreted to support predictions of the
model. Section 4 concludes.
2 A model of education timing
Consider an individual who lives for four periods. He has to decide whether and when
to go to university. To complete a university degree he must study at least two periods.2
Workers with a degree get a salary, W. Workers without a degree are paid a wage which
is high or low depending on the times. In good times the wage, w, is higher than in bad
times, w. A particular period is good with probability p and bad with probability (1−p).
Each period the individual without a degree decides whether to study or not after
observing the opportunity cost, i.e. the wage rate (which is high or low depending on
the times). We normalize the (dis)utility from studying to 0. There are no direct costs
associated with education. The only costs are the foregone earnings. The individual
discounts the future exponentially, with discount factor δ. We shall assume hereafter that
p ∈ (0,1) and δ ∈ (0,1).
The individual is forward looking and maximizes expected lifetime earnings(utility).
T h ed e c i s i o ni ne a c hp e r i o dw i l ld e p e n do nt h ee d u c a t i o n a lh i s t o r y ,i . e . t h en u m b e ro f
periods in which the individual has previously studied. We solve the model by backward
induction starting in period t =4 .
Let ht ∈ {0,1,2} denote the number of periods in which the individual has studied,
at time t. I nt h el a s tp e r i o d( t =4 ) the agent will of course never study. At t =3 ,o n l y
individuals with h3 =1 , will consider studying. We assume that such individuals will
always study, namely
δW ≥ w + δ(pw +( 1− p)w) (1)
δW > w + δ(pw +( 1− p)w))
2We assume a degree requires two study periods in order to allow for the possibiliy of interruptions.
These will, however, not be optimal in this set up. It should be noted that the delay result does not hinge
on this ”bulkyness” assumption. If a degree requires only one period, there is a possibility for delay, but
for lower returns to education than in the present set up.
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The interpretation of this assumption is that the return to education is high enough to
make the individual prefer to forego the high wage, w, for one period, in return for one
period of the graduate salary, W.3
2.1 Decisions at t=2
First consider the case when the individual never studied before, h2 =0 . The individual
will study if:
δ





where w ≡ pw +( 1− p)w, and w2 ∈ {w,w} i st h ew a g er a t ea tt =2 .I f t i m e s a r e

















It is easy to verify that the RHS in(4) exceeds g1
3 and the individual may study in good
times, depending on the actual value of V , if he did not study before (h2 =0 ) .
















As u ﬃcient condition for studying at t =2in bad times is that b0
2(p,δ,γ) <g 1
3. It is easy
to show that b0
2(p,δ,γ) lies above g1
3 when p ≥ 1 − γ(δ(1 − γ))−1.b 0
2(p,δ,γ)=g1
3 at a
p ∈ (0,1) when γ<δ (1 − δ)−1. For γ ≥ δ(1 − δ)−1,b 0
2 lies above g1
3 for all p ∈ (0,1).
Hence, the individual always studies at t =2if γ< δ








Otherwise the individual studies for high enough V. Decisions at t =2when h =0are
illustrated in Figure 6.
3If we are to have delay when a degree takes one study period, we need 1
δ + p 1
γ +( 1− p) ≤ V<
1
δγ + p 1
γ +( 1− p).














Figure 6: Decision at t =2with history h2 =0 .
It is clear that when the individual has not studied before, a pay back time of only one
period will not necessarily make studying for two periods optimal. If V is suﬃciently high,
it obviously will, regardless of the current opportunity cost. If the current opportunity
cost is low (bad times), a small enough diﬀe r e n c eb e t w e e ng o o da n db a dt i m e sa n dal o w
enough probability that the next period is indeed good, will also guarantee studying. This
illustrates that although a one period pay back time is not suﬃcient if times are always
good, it may be suﬃcient if times are bad. This is why delayed education may be optimal
when opportunity costs ﬂuctuate.
Next consider the individual’s decisions at t =2when he has already studied once,




W ≥ w2 + δ
2W (6)









3 t h ea g e n ta l w a y ss t u d i e sa tt =2in good times, if he studied before. If









3 the agent always studies at t =2in bad times, if he studied before.


















Figure 7: Decision at t =2with history h2 =1 .
Clearly the individual is willing to give up one period of the high wage in return for
two periods of the graduate salary, if he is willing to do it for one period of the graduate
salary. This is why we, in general, expect individuals to study early.
2.2 Decisions at t=1
T h en e x ts t e pi st oa n a l y z et h ee d u c a t i o n a ld e c i s i o n so fo u ra g e n t ,g i v e nt h a th ei sf o r w a r d
looking regarding his future decisions. There are three possibilities. In Case A, the return
to education is high enough to make the individual willing to forgo two periods of the
high wage in return for only one period of the graduate salary, V ≥ g0
2. This implies that
the individual will study at t =2regardless of opportunity cost or history. In case B, the
return Case C, the return is so low that a two period payback time is required also if the
individual is going to to education is intermediate, so that the individual is willing to forgo
one period of low and one period of high wages in return for a one period pay-back time,
g0
2 >V ≥ b0
2. This implies that the individual will not study at t =2if the opportunity
cost is high and he did not study before. In be willing to forgo one period of the low and
one period of the high wage, V< b 0
2.
Case A. V> g 0
2 : The agent always studies at t=2, irrespective of the decision taken
at t=1.




W>w 1 + δ
2W. (9)









3 an the agent always studies at t =1in good times, if he plans to study at









3, the agent always studies at t =1in bad times, if he plans to study at
t =2 . Case A is illustrated in Figure 8.


















Figure 8: Decision at t =1.C a s eA .
Again, we have an illustration of that if it pays to get an education one period from
now, it will pay more to get it immediately. When the return is suﬃciently high, education
will not be delayed.
Case B. b0
2 ≤ V< g 0
2 : The agent studies at t =2u n l e s st i m e sa r eg o o da n dh ed i d
not study before.




























When γ>(1 + δ + δ
2)−1 ,g B
1 <b 0



























which is always below b0
2, hence the agent always studies at t =1if times are bad. Results
for Case B are illustrated in Figure 9.















Figure 9: Decision at t =1 ,C a s eB .
When the agent knows that he will study (and hence complete his education) at t =2
(and t =3 ) if the times are bad, he will decide to delay the education investment if times
are good at t =1 .T h ec o n d i t i o n sa r es u c hw h e nt h eg o o dw a g ei sl a r g ei nr e l a t i o nt ot h e
bad wage (γ is low) and the probability of good times is low. The delay result hinges in
that the agent may, but is not sure to complete his degree if he decides not to study at
t =1 .I fh ei ss u r et oc o m p l e t e( C a s eA ) ,i tw i l la l w a y sg i v eab e t t e rp a yo ﬀ to complete
early. If he is not sure to complete, but the value of the high wage is not interesting
enough (γ is high) or if the likelihood of completion is too low, (p is high) the individual
does not dare delay.
Case C: V< b 0
2, namely the agent studies at t =2only if he studied before.





W>w 1 +( δ + δ
2 + δ
3)w (15)



















2 for all p and the agent will study at t =0if V is high
enough. If (1−δ) <γ<(1+δ+δ
2)−1 ,g C
1 Q b0
2 for all p R (1−γ(1+δ+δ
2))/(δ
2(1−γ)).
γ<(1 − δ),g C
1 >b 0
2. Hence, if γ is low, the agent never studies in good times at t =1 .















It can be shown that bC
1 <b 0
2. Furthermore, for γ>δ ,b C
1 >g 1




3 for p>(1 + δ)(δ − γ)(δ(1 − γ))−1.When γ<δ
2,b C
1 <g 1
3. Hence if γ<δ
2, the
agent always studies in bad times. If γ ∈ (δ
2,δ), the agent will always study in bad times,
provided that the probability of good times in the next period is low enough. Otherwise
the agent will study in bad times only if V is high enough.
11I ft h ea g e n tk n o w st h a th ew i l lo n l ys t u d ya tt =2if he studied before, delay is not
an option.
We can conclude that under certain conditions we will observe that individuals delay
their education. Delay will be a possibility only if there is uncertainty about completion
and if the diﬀerence between the high and the low wage is large enough. Furthermore, if
the risk of not completing is too high, (p high) delay does not take place. If the return to
education is very high, delay does not occur and the decision to study is then independent
of the realization of the opportunity cost. If completion is uncertain, but probable the
individual will decide to delay if times are initially good. The delayer will only complete
his education if times are bad at t =2 .
3 Some empirical evidence on education timing
Our stylized model generates at least two testable hypotheses. First, it is clear that
delayed education is an alternative only if returns to education are relatively low. Second,
ﬂuctuations in the opportunity cost of time should aﬀect the timing of education only if
the return to education is relatively low. Formally testing these implications is beyond
the scope of this paper, but we shall nevertheless present some evidence in support of
these hypotheses.
Figure 10 presents a scatter-plot of the OLS estimates for male return to education
for the 1985-1995 period from Trostel et al (2002) against OECD data on the median age
of University freshmen (Tertiary A type educations) for 1999. There is a clear, and sta-
tistically signiﬁcant at the 5 percent level, negative relation. The slope of the line implies
that an increase by one percentage point of the return to education is associated with
2-3 months lower freshman age. The linear trend line has an R2 =0 .13. It is interesting
to note that Israel has a remarkably high median age, probably as a result of lengthy
mandatory military service. If the outliers, UK and Israel are excluded, R2 =0 .24,a n d
the negative relation is still signiﬁcant at the 10 per cent level and implies that increasing
the return to education by one percentage point lowers the freshman age by 4-5 months.
12Return to education 1985-1995 and freshman median age in 1999
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Figure 11 illustrates the evolution of Swedish young (21 or younger) freshman enroll-
ment for students with diﬀerent family background. The ﬁgure reports the evolution of
enrollment indexes where the number of enrolled freshmen is set to 100 in 1990/91. Over-
all enrollment of young freshmen increased remarkably in the early nineties and leveled
oﬀ in the mid nineties. Students whose parents have at least some university education
show an enrollment pattern very similar to the total of all young students, neither seems
to be aﬀected by the improved unemployment ﬁgures of the late 1990’s. The evolution of
enrollment of the young freshmen whose parent have only basic education shows a pattern
strikingly similar to the unemployment ﬁgures. Their enrollment is positively aﬀected by
the university expansion and by the rising unemployment ﬁgures of the early nineties, but
contrary to their fellow freshmen, this group’s enrollment ﬁgures decline as the economic
climate improves and unemployment falls.
13Swedish youth unemployment (age 18-24) and university enrollment fluctuations of young freshmen (21 and 
younger) 
by parental education
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Figure 11
4 Conclusions
We have shown that when there are ﬂuctuations in, and uncertainty about the opportunity
cost of time, marginal individuals may choose to delay their education if times are good.
It is when the beneﬁts associated with education are low and the event of completing
the degree uncertain, but not too unlikely, that individuals will consider delaying their
education. This prediction of the paper ﬁnds some support when estimates of returns to
education and median age of university freshmen are compared across countries. At the
individual level, it is the group of individuals with mediocre or low returns that will be
more prone to delay or not opting for education at all when facing ﬂuctuating opportunity
costs. Also this prediction ﬁnds some support in Swedish enrollment patterns.
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